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Introduction
In the context of the increasing awareness of a human induced climate change, emission trading as one possible instrument to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has moved into the centre of the discussion in the last years. In the very beginning the instrument has been applied for other than GHG emissions especially in the US. In 1997 the Kyoto-Protocol was agreed upon that sets the framework for GHG emission trading on country level. Certain Parties to the Protocol are allowed to trade the so-called Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) in order to fulfil their obligations that are determined in absolute emissions compared to 1990 levels': For example, for the first five year commitment period starting in 2008 Germany is allowed to emit 79% of 1990's emissions whereas others as Australia may increase emission up to 108% of 1990 emissions.
A country can either make use of the so-called flexible mechanisms under the Protocol and buy emission rights abroad or reduce domestically by policies and measures (P&M). Among these P&Ms, market based instruments have attracted a lot of attention (especially by economists). For example, the European Commission suggested an European energy tax in the early '90s but it was never introduced. Only recently emission trading on entity level has become the focal point of the discussion. Numerous "governmental -industry working groups" were set up to discuss what a potential trading scheme involving private actors could look like (see for example AGE (2002) , AGO (1999) , MIES (2000) , NZME (1998) When creating national trading schemes a lot of design features have to be decided on. A very important point from the firms' perspective is the question of how the emission rights 1 will be allocated. This issue has been discussed in numerous studies (AGE (2002) , AGO (1999) , CCAP (2002) , Field (2000) , MIES (2000) , NZME (1998). However, they only address general issues or, in case they go into detail, they only consider a one period game and do not discuss the impact of different allocation options in subsequent commitment periods. This paper tries to shed some light on this issue: I analyse the implications of different allocation options for multi-period emission trading focussing on the total costs (i.e. efficiency of the 1 The term emission right and allowance are used equivalently. Other authors talk about permits in this context. After the EU Commission has proposed a directive on emission trading this might be a bit misleading as the term "permit" is used in another sense in this directive (like a permission or approval).
instrument) as well as on the individual firms' compliance costs for an allowance selling and a buying firm respectively. Furthermore, potential incentives to increase output in one period in order to get more emission rights in a subsequent period are studied.
In the following chapter I briefly discuss general options for allocating emission rights. I then focus on an allocation based on historical emissions and on benchmarks using two-player two-period model. As the analytical solution is difficult to interpret, numerical examples are provided subsequently. Finally, the potential incentives mentioned above are studied.
Emission trading and Allocation of allowances
Emission trading 2 allows to meet an absolute emission target cost-efficiently. However, the answer to the question of who is bearing the costs is not incorporated in the instrument itself and has to be treated separately ("question of burden sharing"). Participants in the trading scheme can decide whether they want to abate emissions internally or to buy emission rights on the market. At the end of a period each emitter has to have at least as much allowances as he actually emitted into the atmosphere. The decision to buy allowances is driven by the question if in-house marginal abatement costs are lower than the allowance price. As each player faces this problem, marginal abatement costs are equalised among sources at the end of the period.
Before trading can start the participants have to be allocated a certain quantity of emission rights. Allowances may either be provided free of charge or charged. For trading on company level economists have argued in favour of a charged allocation or more precisely an auction as giving the allowances for free would result in an extra revenue for the receivers of the allowances (Cramton and Kerr (2002) , Field (2000) p. 31, Woerdman (2002) p. 620).
However, others have argued that this question can only be answered when comparing the concrete design of an auction (for example "How is the revenue from the auction recycled?") and a free of charge scheme respectively (for example Bohm (2002)). On the other hand, those who would be obliged to participate ask for an allocation free of charge (Com (2001b, p.2) ) and the current status of discussion on the EU trading scheme also suggests that an allocation free of charge is likely to be the method of choice at least for the initial period. I focus on this method below.
2 In this paper emission trading is used in the sense of a cap-and-trade system.
A very important point for the allocation of allowances in GHG trading schemes as it is understood in this paper, is that the total budget is more or less given by the commitments made under the Kyoto-Protocol. 3 Consequently, a simple bottom-up approach -that is to say where individual allocation is made without reflecting the total budget constraint -does not seem appropriate. 4 An adjustment with the national budget has to be made (top-down approach).
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Determining the share of emission allowances (static analysis)
The available quantity for all participants has to be distributed among participants somehow. A revelation mechanism would be desirable / necessary (as for example an auction), but in a free of charge setting hard to define.
• Others (e.g. turn over, employees etc.) 3 This is not really true for any trading before the entry into force of the Protocol. For a discussion see Bode (2003) and Rehdanz and Tol (2002) 4 Such an approach would indeed be possible if other sectors than the participating ones get a smaller share of available national budget. This might cause a lot of resistance by the other sectors as they would have to bear a stronger burden. This is why such an approach is not further considered. 5 In the context of the Kyoto-Protocol, the budget can be enlarged by the purchase of CERs/ERUs from CDM and JI-projects respectively. But as this induces additional costs that have to be borne by someone, it is not considered as an option: from the participants' point of view the total costs are most relevant regardless where they exactly accrue.
-Does not seem reasonable as these figures are, if at all, only slightly correlated to emissions and use of these figures could consequently lead to strong distributional effects.
• Any combination of these Below I focus on an allocation based on historical emissions -what is often referred to as grandfathering 6 -and on benchmarks that are both by far most frequently mentioned in the reports cited above.
A straightforward approach for an allocation based on historical emissions (grandfathering) could be: Emissions are allocated proportionately to the single emitters' share of the total emissions, formally:
where A i = emissions allowances allocated to company i; I i = emission intensity of company i; q i = output of company i; A = total quantity of emission rights to be distributed to the participants.
For a general benchmark 7 the allocation could look like shown in equation (2).
where s = general specific emission factor (t CO 2 /unit), q i = output of company i (unit) 6 However, as emission reductions are still necessary for almost all Annex B countries, grandfathering can generally not mean distribution of emission rights equal to historical emissions (bottom-up approach) An adjustment according to the total budget available is necessary -or in other words: grandfathering is an allocation method based on historical emissions (top-down approach). 7 Theoretically, individual benchmarks for each emitter are conceivable. However, as there are already more than 4000 installations expected to participate in the initial phase of the EU-trading scheme, the use of such company specific benchmarks seems at least administratively infeasible. 8 When creating real world systems one should be aware of the fact that in case different sectors (heat and power, pulp and paper etc.) participate, different "sub-budget" for each benchmark have to be determined as specific emission factors are only applicable if the reference figure is used by all members of the subset.
Determining the share of emission rights in successive periods
Trading schemes can be designed as one-period as well as multi-period schemes where the latter option is much more likely to be realised. In the following section a general model for an analytical analysis of the different allocation options is introduced before a numerical approach is used to study the impacts.
The Model
In order to analyse the impact of different allocation options on the participants let us consider a two-player, two-period market, in which the emitters face different abatement costs (which are assumed to be quadratic in the reduction technologies implemented). Let us denote the buying firm with the index a and the firm with the lower abatement costs (seller) with the index b. No banking between the periods is allowed. The lifetime of the investment is one period 9 , so that each firm can decide 10 on the abatement level in each period independently. I distinguish between two abatement technologies: a) An end-of-pipe approach 11 , that is to say specific emissions during production do not change. Emissions are rather removed at the end of the production chain. b) Improvement of the emission intensity of the production.
As -especially with the rolling allocation approach -the number of permits allocated in the second period may depend on the emissions (and thus on the emission reductions) in the first period, the two players minimise costs over both periods already at the very beginning of the trading scheme. Transaction costs are neglected. They face the optimisation problem:
where, C = Costs, α = parameter, R = investment in in-house abatement technologies (t CO2 -eq ), π = allowance price (assuming a perfect market where each participant faces the same price), P = quantity of allowances bought or sold, δ = discount factor
Abatement by end-of-pipe technologies
When using an end-of-pipe technology the emitters have to consider the constraints
index 1;2 = period one and two respectively, I = Emission, q = output (product) A = allocation
As mentioned an allocation based on emissions as well as on benchmarks is studied.
Allocation based on historical emissions
Constant allocation
In the case of a constant allocation based on emissions the individual allocation would be:
9 As long as the total reduction obligation (i.e. total expected emissions minus total budget of allowances) is equal or less in the following periods, each emitter reduces at least as much as he did in the preceding period so that the affect could be interpreted as a lifetime of two periods for those reductions undertaken in the first period and additional reductions in the second one. 10 Indeed, emitters do not really decide about their reduction level. In a perfect market, as is assumed here, reductions are rather prescribed by the total reduction obligation and the marginal cost curves of the different players. 11 As for example carbon dioxide removal from flue gases.
Minimising eq. (7), (8) and (4a) gives
We see that the problem is nearly symmetrical for both periods. Marginal abatement costs in period one and two differ by the discount factor. Other differences may occur in case the output and thus emissions changes over time.
Rolling base period
A rolling period means that allocation is done on the basis of a period later than the initial one In the case of a rolling allocation based on (historical) emissions the individual allocation would be:
With a rolling allocation (7), (8) and (4b) minimise as (9) except for P 2 which is:
We can see that, unlike in the case with constant allocation, the quantity traded in period two is dependent on the total budget of period one (A 1 ). This seems to be sound as the total budget in period one determines the players' reductions (and thus emissions) in period one that (can) in turn form the basis for the allocation in period two.
Allocation based on benchmarks
In this analysis the term "benchmark" is used in the sense of a specific emission factor, i.e. output emissions .
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As mentioned above, the allocation based on a general benchmark could be calculated as
As already pointed out above an alignment between bottom-up (benchmark) approach and top-down constraint would be necessary to consider the constraint given in inequality (6). A straightforward approach would be the introduction of a correction factor as discussed for
Taking into account this factor, (5) changes to (10)
As we can see by transforming equation (10), a benchmark based allocation, that takes into account the national budget (e.g. the Kyoto Commitment), results in an individual allocation that is only proportional to a participant's output and not at all related to emission intensities. 12 Theoretically, any benchmark as, for example, labour productivity could be used for allocation. For an emission benchmark, other reference figures than the output could also be used (e.g. turnover).
This might be somewhat surprising as the intention of the use of a benchmark is generally to consider the specific emissions. Again (7), (8) and (10a) minimise as (9) except for P 1 and P 2 which are:
As we can see, the quantity traded depends on the total budget of allowances available in the period analysed, the output, the intensity and the parameters α.
Rolling allocation
With a rolling allocation the individual budget amounts to: (8) and (10b) solve as (9) except for the quantity traded in each period:
13 Compliance costs can of course differ, but not as a consequence of different allocations but rather as a consequence of different abatement costs (see also numerical examples below).
As one might have expected, the quantity traded in the first period equals the one with a constant benchmark approach whereas the one traded in the second period changes in that it is also dependent on the available budget in this period and the output in period one.
Abatement by improvement of emission intensity
When improving emission intensity of the production in order to reduce emission the output is not only relevant for calculating the emissions (see r.h.s of inequality (8)) but also for the reduction (see l.h.s. of (8a)). The two emitters now face the constraints
where R = investment in in-house improvement of emission intensity (in t CO2 -eq / unit)
The allocation remains unaffected by the change of the abatement technology. (4a, 4b, 10a, 10b are the same.)
Allocation based on historical emissions
Constant allocation
Minimising eq. (7), (8a) and (4a) gives
We see that the problem solves nearly symmetrically for both periods. Marginal abatement costs in period one and two differ by the discount factor. Other differences may occur in case the output and thus emissions change over time.
Rolling base period
With a rolling allocation (7), (8a) and (4b) minimises as (9g) except for P 2 which is: 
Allocation based on benchmarks
The characteristics / implications of a general benchmark have been discussed during the analysis of the end-of-pipe technology. They equally apply in the case of reductions by the improvement of the emission intensity.
Constant allocation
Again (7), (8a) and (10a) minimises as (9g) except for P1 and P2 which are:
As we can see the quantity traded only changes with the change of the total budget of allowances available and the output of the emitters in the period analysed.
Rolling allocation
For the rolling allocation (7), (8a) and (10b) minimises as (9g) apart from P2 which is: 2  1  1   2  1  2  2  2  1  2  2  1  2  2  1  2  2  1  2  2  1 
As one might have expected, the quantity traded in the first period equals the one with a constant benchmark approach whereas the one traded in the second period changes in that it is dependent on the available budget in this period and the output in period one and two.
Numerical Analysis
As the difference between the approaches is not obvious from the analytical solution I analyse some numerical examples. Three scenarios for each technology (end-of-pipe reductions and intensity improvement) are presented.
I study certain cases by presenting the solution in detail in order to understand the players' actions assuming that they minimise costs as a function of the output which is exogenously given (non-strategic behaviour). Following this, I try to find out whether there are incentives to vary output in period one in order to get a more beneficial allocation in the subsequent period (strategic behaviour).
Non strategic behaviour
In this section the market is analysed assuming that each player minimises his costs depending on an exogenously given output. Throughout this analysis the total budget in period one and two respectively as well as the parameter α i are kept constant. Only output and emission intensities are changed.
Equal emission intensities
The first analysis is based on the values given Tab. 1. The corresponding results of the model are presented in Tab. 2. Tab. 3 and 4 summarise the preferences of the two players when the output changes. The underlying tables for the determination of the preferences can be found in the annex (Tab. A1 to A5). As can be seen, emission intensities are equal for both player in the first analysis. 
1) 2)
3)
For the discussion of the result shown in Tab. 2 we concentrate on the second period: The different allocation options start to be effective at that time. Total emissions for both players are equal to the total budget as given in Tab. 1 (point 1)). As by emission trading emissions are reduced where it is cheapest, reductions by both player are the same for both a constant and a rolling allocation (point 2)). Consequently, total costs do not change by choosing different allocation options for the same total reduction obligation (point 2)) since the abatement cost curves are not affected by the initial allocation.
What can indeed be affected are the players' compliance costs. In the first period there is no change in the individual compliance costs with varying approaches.. In the second period, i.e.
when the rolling approach starts being effective, compliance costs may, however, change considerably. Only when the output is constant, there is no difference in the second period for the benchmark allocation. This is due to the fact that the allocation is only a function of the output (see section on general benchmark) that is kept constant.
With an emission-based allocation the situation is different. As player a reduces less emissions in the first period due to the higher abatement costs compared to b (point A)), he gets more allowances in the second period (point B)) what in turn reduces his compliance costs. The opposite is true for player b. Driven by the market, he reduces more in the first period than a -resulting in a reduced allocation and higher compliance costs in period two (point C)).
The situation is different when output changes. Then, the benchmark approach delivers another outcome in the second period, too (see tables in the annex). With the buyer growing, he prefers the rolling benchmark allocation to a constant one. For the scenarios studied 14 , however, player a (buyer) prefers the rolling emission based allocation to the rolling benchmark in absolute terms. Obviously, with the model set-up chosen, there is no incentive for the player with the lower abatement costs to renounce investments in the first period to avoid reduced allocation in the second one with a rolling allocation. His cost minimising strategy is to invest anyhow.
To sum it up, seller and buyer do have different preferences with regard to the design of the scheme that are summarised in Tab. 3 and 4.
Even though overall ranking of preferences are dependent on the reduction technology applied it can be seen, that -with equal emission intensities (!) -the net buyer always prefers 14 A number of scenarios with different parameters than those given in Tab. 1 have been studied.
the emission based rolling allocation that in turn (as it is a zero sum game) ranks lowest in the seller's priority. 
Different emission intensities
In this chapter different emission intensities for the two players are analysed. I presume that the intensity of the player with the lower abatement cost curve is the higher one. One may argue that he has not undertaken any action to reduce emissions yet and that there are still some "low hanging fruits".
The total compliance costs that determine the preferences are exemplarily shown for the case of reductions by end-of-pipe technology and constant output in Tab. 5. Opposed to the situation with equal emission intensities there is no clear preference discernible as it differs depending the concrete intensity assumed. However, a general tendency can be observed that is depicted in Fig. 1 . ( see Tab. A6 to A10 in the annex). This is because these intensities are not relevant for the allocation at all (which rather depends on the output only )whereas he would receive less emission rights with an emission-based approach.
With very high intensities for player b, he even becomes a net-buyer. This is because any player first has to meet his emission target before he can sell any surplus allowances. If the reduction obligation (i.e. emissions minus allocation) becomes to big, marginal abatement costs at the point of meeting the target are too high even he has an abatement cost curve that is more flat than the one of player a. The general preferences shown above remain unaffected.
Strategic behaviour
As mentioned above, Edwards and Hutton (2001, p. 375) stated that "however, if companies expect that, by emitting more now, they get a larger allowance allocation in the future, there would be a counterbalancing incentive to continue emitting". In this part, I want to focus on this issue. An incentive for one of the players would be given if total costs over both periods would be lower for one of them in case he increases his emissions in the first period. This can be done differently. A player may for example decide to increase production / stock in the first period (and thus emissions) to get more allowances in the second one. However, one has to keep in mind that the allocation in the first period remains unaffected of any of such consideration. Thus, increased output (emissions) in the first period would entail increased costs for the additional emissions, too. Alternatively, he may decide to intentionally decrease efficiency to increase emissions. Below, the first option is analysed.
It is modelled as follows: once a player has decided to increase stock 15 (emissions), every participant minimises costs under the new conditions (i.e. equation (7), the different constraints as well as the different allocation options apply as in the parts above). The number of units produced in addition to the reference case (q a1 = q b1 = 10) in the first period is deducted from those in the second period (q a2 / q b2 ) so that the sum for each player is always constant (q a1 + q a2 = q b1 + q b2 = 20). As can been seen in Fig. 2 to 5 both players can reduce their total costs over both periods by increasing production in the first period to a certain degree. Beyond this point, the benefits from a higher allocation in the second period are lost for higher compliance costs in the first one. With a constant allocation the costs are the same for both, emission-based and benchmark allocation. For a rolling allocation, however, the situation is different. Player a prefers the emission based approach for the range of output depicted in Fig. 2 and 4 (i.e.
quantities around player a's cost minimum). 16 On the other hand player b prefers the benchmark. (I only discuss the point of view of the emitter who increases output.)
When asking for the preferences with regard to a rolling and a constant allocation we find that the player with the higher marginal abatement costs always prefers the former (regardless whether it is emission-or benchmark-based) whereas the seller's position depend on the output in period one. If one asks for the optimal quantity to produce in period one, it turns out that it is indeed dependent on the allocation method applied.
Furthermore, we can see that the total costs (a and b) also decrease to a certain level with increasing output in period one. This can be explained by the more stringent allocation in period two that makes emissions at that time more expensive.
As we have seen, both players have an incentive to increase output to a certain degree so that the question arises what happens in case they take their decision independently and both start to extend their production? Fig 6 and 7 show the impact on the costs with both players increasing output by the same amount.
16 For a very large increase of output this changes and he prefers the benchmark. Obviously, with small increases the fact that he reduces less emissions due to his higher abatement costs and the resulting increased allocation in the second period is dominating. With large increases of output this effect is topped by the resulting bigger allocation with a benchmark approach. 
In Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 we see again the potential to lower the total costs over both periods by increasing (cumulative) output to some extend in the first period. We can also see that, if each player chooses the optimal quantity from his point of view (see Fig. 2 to 5), the cumulative output is bigger than the (total) cost minimising one. Interestingly, this benefits player b more than player a. A game theoretical analysis of this (interactive) decision problem is desirable.
However, when discussing the findings presented in Fig 2 to 7 we have to keep in mind that the outcome is specific to the underlying model that is restricted to two periods only. It goes without saying that a reduced output in period two would have an impact on the allocation in period three and so on. An extended model in the ongoing analysis will take this into account.
Conclusion
GHG-Emission trading has become more and more important in the context of climate change in recent years. After trading on country level has been agreed in 1997 in the Kyoto-Protocol, it is currently under discussion on entity level. Before implementing any scheme a lot of design features have be decided on with the question on how to allocate the allowances being a very important one from the participants' point of view. The latter have argued for an allocation free of charge.
For this, I have analysed the implications of an allocation free of charge based on historical emissions and on benchmarks in multi-period emission trading. Different allocation methods in the successive periods have been studied in this paper using a two-player two-period model. I find that -even though all participants are likely to agree on an allocation free of charge -they have different preferences with regard to the allocation method over time. With equal emission intensities, the net-buying emitter prefers a rolling, emission-based allocation to any other option as the number of allowances received increases in the second period. Thus compliance costs are reduced. The net-seller on the other hand is likely to reject this option as it entails the highest compliance costs. With different emission intensities, preferences may change depending on the intensity. Furthermore, it turned out that a benchmark-based allocation that takes into account a total budget constraint as, for example, the Kyoto targets of Annex B countries, results in an individual allocation that is only depending on the emitters' share of the total output and that is thus not dependent on the individual emission intensities anymore. Consequently, there would be no need to try to determine any of such benchmark as it is currently done in the context of the upcoming EU directive on emissions trading.
The total costs for meeting the overall reduction target are, however, not affected by the individual allocation as emissions are reduced where abatement is cheapest. This would imply that national authorities developing a national allocation plan, could choose whatever option they like or simply allocate emission rights to those emitters "screaming loudest".
Eventually, we found that seller and buyer have an incentive to increase output in the first period to a certain degree in order to get more allowances in the second one and thus to reduce total costs over both periods. If both player decide to do so individually, the total costs may become higher than the potential minimum.
All results are derived from the specific model and the assumptions made. Further analyses (the role of banking, of different life-times of the investments and game theoretic implications from the incentive to increase output in early periods) will be carried out. All errors are mine.
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